Abstract-Relational database mining, where data are mined across multiple relations, is increasingly commonplace. When considering a complex database schema, it becomes difficult to identify all possible relationships between attributes from the different relations. That is, seemingly harmless attributes may be linked to confidential information, leading to data leaks when building a model. In this way, we are at risk of disclosing unwanted knowledge when publishing the results of a data mining exercise. For instance, consider a financial database classification task to determine whether a loan is considered to be high risk. Suppose that we are aware that the database contains another confidential attribute, such as income level, which should not be divulged. In order to prevent potential privacy leakage, one may thus choose to eliminate, or distort, the income level from the database. However, even after distortion, a learning model against the modified database may accurately determine the income level values. It follows that the database is still unsafe and may be compromised. This paper demonstrates this potential for privacy leakage in multirelational classification and illustrates how such potential leaks may be detected. We propose a method to generate a ranked list of subschemas which maintains the predictive performance on the class attribute, while limiting the disclosure risk, and predictive accuracy, of confidential attributes. We illustrate our method against a financial database.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of commercial relational databases, which store vast amounts of real-world data, is growing exponentially. Increasingly, concerns regarding potential data privacy breaches are emerging. One of the main issues organizations face is identifying, avoiding or limiting the inference of attribute values. For relational databases, it is difficult to be able to identify all attribute interrelationships, due to the complexities of the database schemas that contain multiple relations.
Would it, then, not be enough to eliminate, distort, or limit access to confidential data? Our analysis shows that this is not the case. We show that, when following such an approach, there may still be a disclosure of data during multi-relational classification. We demonstrate that, through using publicly available information and insider knowledge, one may still be able to inject an attack which accurately predicts the values of confidential, or so-called sensitive, attributes.
To address the above-mentioned potential privacy breaches, we propose a method which limits the predictive accuracy against previously identified confidential attributes. To this end, the paper introduces a method which generates a ranked list of subschemas of a database. Each subschema has a different balance between the two prediction accuracies, namely the target variables and the confidential attributes. The objective here is to create subschemas which maintain the predictive performance on the target class label, but limit the prediction accuracy on confidential attributes. We show the effectiveness of our strategy against a financial database.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the background and problem formulation. Next, in Section III, we introduce our method for privacy protection. This is followed, in Section IV, by the discussion of our experimental studies. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and outlines our future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Privacy leakage protection in data mining strives to prevent revealing sensitive data without invalidating the data mining results [1] , [2] , [3] . Often data anonymization operations are applied [4] .
Current approaches for privacy preserving data mining aim at distorting individual data values, but enabling reconstruction of the original distributions of the values of the confidential attributes [1] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] . For example, the k-anonymity model [7] and the perturbing method [8] are two techniques for achieving this goal.
Recent research deals with correlation and association between attributes to prevent the inference of sensitive data [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] . For example, Association Rule Hiding (ARH) methods sanitize datasets in order to prevent disclosing sensitive association rules from the modified data [9] , [12] , [14] . Zhu and Du [13] incorporate kanonymity into the association rule hiding process. Tao et al. propose a method to distort data in order to hide correlations between non-sensitive attributes [10] . Data leakage prevention in releasing multiple views from databases has also been intensively studied [15] . In addition, privacy leakage in multi-party environment has been investigated [16] .
Our method does not distort the original data in order to protect sensitive information. Rather, we select a subset of data from the original database. The selected attributes are able to maintain high accuracies against the target variables, while lowering the predictive capability against confidential attributes, thus alleviating the risk of probabilistic (belief) attacks of sensitive attributes [4] . This stands in contrast to the above-mentioned anonymization techniques, such as generalization, suppression, anatomization, permutation, and perturbation.
Furthermore, it follows that our approach is not tied to a specific data mining technique, since there is no need to learn from masked data.
A. Multirelational Database Classification
In this paper, a relational database is described by a set of tables {R 1 ,· · ·,R n }. Each table R i consists of a set of tuples T Ri , a primary key, and a set of foreign keys. Foreign key attributes link to primary keys of other tables. This type of linkage defines a join between the two tables involved. A set of joins with n tables R 1 · · · R n describes a join path, where the length of it is defined as the number of joins it contains.
A multirelational classification task involves a relational database which consists of a target relation R t , a set of background relations {R b }, and a set of joins {J} [17] . Each tuple in this target relation, i.e. x ∈ T Rt , is associated with a class label which belongs to Y (target classes). Typically, the task here is to find a function F (x) which maps each tuple x from the target table R t to the category Y . That is,
B. Privacy Leakage in Multirelational Classification
We formalize the problem of privacy leakage in multirelational classification as follows.
Given is a relational database = (R t , {R b }) with target attribute Y in R t . Together with this information, we have an attribute C that is to be protected. C ∈ {R b } 1 , and C has either to be removed from the database or the values have to be distorted. However, C may potentially be predicted using with high accuracy. Our objective is to find a subschema that accurately predict the target variable, but yields a poor prediction for the confidential attribute. To this end, we generate a ranked list of subschemas of . Each subschema ( ⊂ ) predict the target variable Y with high accuracy, but has limited predictive capability against the confidential attribute C. To this end, we construct a number of different subschemas of . For each subschema , we determine how well it predicts the target variable Y and we calculate its degree of sensitivity in terms of predicting the confidential attribute C. Finally, we rank the subschemas based on this information. In the next sections, we discuss our approach.
III. TARGET SHIFTING MULTIRELATIONAL CLASSIFICATION Our Target Shifting Multirelational Classification (TSMC) approach aims to prevent the prediction of confidential attributes, while maintain the predictive performance of the target variable. To this end, as described in Algorithm 1, the TSMC method consists of the following four (4) steps.
Firstly, the attributes that are correlated with a confidential attribute, are identified. Note that, following Tao et. al, [10] we here use the term correlation to denote the associations, interrelationships or links between attributes in our database. It follows that such correlated attributes may reside in relations other than the confidential attribute. Secondly, based on the correlation computed from the first step, the degrees of sensitivity for different subschemas of the database are calculated. Next, subschemas consisting of different tables of the database are constructed. Finally, for each subschema, its performance when predicting the target variable, along with its privacy sensitivity level, is computed. As a result, a ranked list of subschemas is provided. These four steps are discussed next.
A. Identify Correlated Attributes Across Interlinked Tables
In the first phase of the TSMC method, the aim is to identify the attributes that are correlated with the confidential attribute C. That is, this step aims to find attributes which may be used to predict C. To find correlated attributes, one needs to compute the correlation between attribute sets across the multiple tables of the database. To address the above issue, the TSMC method learns a set of high quality rules against the confidential attribute C. That is, it searches attributes (attribute sets) across multiple tables to find a set of rules which predict the values of C well. To this end, we employ the CrossMine algorithm, which is able to accurately and efficiently construct a set of conjunctive rules using features across multiple relations in a database [18] In summary, we use CrossMine to learn which other attributes are correlated, or have a relationship with, the confidential attributes.
That is, our approach uses a set of rules as created by this classifier, to identify the most relevant attributes. It follows that an implicit assumption is that an informative classification model is constructed by CrossMine.
The TSMC method ranks the constructed rules based on their tuple coverages and then selects the first n rules which cover more than 50% of the training tuples. That is, the algorithm considers the set of rules which can predict the confidential attributes better than random guessing.
Algorithm 1 The TSMC Approach
Input: a relational database = (R t , {R b }); Y ∈ R t is the target variable and C ∈ {R b } is a confidential attribute Output: a ranked list of subschemas of . Each subschema can predict Y with high accuracy, but has limited predictive capability against C 1: using C (instead of Y ) as the classification target, construct a set of high quality rules using 2: derive the subschema privacy sensitivity P from the set of rules learned 3: convert schema into undirected graph G(V, E), there R t and R b as nodes V and joins J as edges E 4: construct a set of subgraphs from G ⇒ subgraphs set
compute the PI (with respect to the target variable Y ) of the subgraph subset (namely, subschema ∈ ) 7: end for 8: rank the { } based on their PI values 9: return the ranked { }
B. Assign Privacy Sensitivity to Subschemas
After obtaining a set of rules which find the other attributes that are relevant when learning the confidential attributes, the TSMC method estimates the predictive capability of the subschemas.
Consider the following rule which predicts an order's payment type in the Order table with 70% accuracy.
Order.payment type = house payment ← (Order.amount >= 1833) (Order.account id Disposition.account id) (Disposition.client id Client.client id) (Client.birth date <= 31/10/1937) Thus, if our published subschema includes tables Order, Disposition, and Client, one may use this subschema to build a classification model and then to determine an order's payment type with 70% accuracy.
The previous observation suggests that, by using the set of high quality rules learned, we can estimate the degree of sensitivity (denoted as P) of a subschema, in terms of its predictive capability on the confidential attribute. P for a subschema is calculated as follows. Firstly, we identify the set of m (m ⊆ n) rules whose conjunctive features are covered by some or all of the tables in the subschema. Next, we sum the number of tuples covered by each one of these rules (denoted as N C i ). Finally, we divide the sum by the total number of tuples (noted as N S) containing the confidential attributes. Formally, the value P for a subschema is calculated as follows.
For example, as the above-mentioned rule covers 70% of the total number of tuples, we will assign 0.7 as the degree of sensitivity for the subschema {Order, Disposition, Client}. Note that, there may be another rule against this subschema, such as
Order.payment type = house payment ← (Order.amount >= 1833) (Order.account id Disposition.account id)(Disposition.type = owner) In this case, the sensitivity of subschema {Loan, Account, Client} should be calculated using all tuples covered by the two rules. This is due to the fact that CrossMine is a sequential covering method. The next step of the TSMC method, as described in Algorithm 1, is to construct a set of subschemas and evaluate their contained information, in terms of predicting both the target variable Y and the confidential attribute C.
C. Subschema Evaluation
The TSMC method adopts the subschema construction approach presented by Guo and Viktor in [17] . That is, in the TSMC method, each subschema consists of a set of subgraphs, each corresponds to a unique join path in the relational database. The subgraph construction procedure is discussed, next.
1) Subgraph Construction:
The subgraph construction process aims to build a set of subgraphs given a relational database schema where each subgraph corresponds to a unique join path. The construction process initially converts the relational database schema into an undirected graph, using the relations as the nodes and the joins as edges.
Two heuristic constraints are imposed on each constructed subgraph. The first is that each subgraph must start at the target relation. This constraint ensures that each subgraph contains the target relation and, therefore, is able to construct a classification model. The second constraint is for relations to be unique for each candidate subgraph. Typically in a relational domain, the number of possible join paths given a large number of relations is very large, making it too costly to exhaustively search all join paths [18] . Also, join paths with many relations may decrease the number of entities related to the target tuples. Therefore, this restriction was introduced for a trade off between accuracy and efficiency.
Using these constraints, the subgraph construction process proceeds initially by finding unique join paths with two relations, i.e. join paths with a length of one. These join paths are progressively lengthened, one relation at a time. The length of the join path is introduced as the stopping criterion. The construction process prefers subgraphs with shorter length. The reason for preferring shorter subgraphs is that semantic links with too many joins are usually very weak in a relational database [18] . Thus the algorithm specifies a maximum length for the join paths. When this number is reached, the join path extraction process terminates.
After constructing a set of subgraphs, the TSMC algorithm is then able to form different subschemas and evaluate their predictive capabilities on both the target and confidential attributes.
2) SubInfo of Subgraph: Recall that each subschema consists of a set of subgraphs. To have better predictive capability for the target variables, we prefer to have a set of subgraphs which are (a) strongly correlated to the target variables, but (b) uncorrelated with one another. The first condition ensures that the subgraphs can be useful for predicting the target variables. The second condition guarantees that information in each subgraph does not overlapped, when predicting the class. That is, we conduct a form of pruning, in order to identify diverse subgraphs. It follows that all new subschemas which are subsumed by, or highly correlated to, a high risk subschema also poses a risk. To enhance privacy, all subschemas should thus be tested before releasing them to the users.
In order to estimate the correlation between subgraphs, we adopted the SubInfo calculation as presented by Guo and Viktor in [17] . In their approach, SubInfo is used to describe the knowledge held by a subgraph with respect to the target classes in the target relation. Following the same line of thought, the class probabilistic predictions generated by a given subgraph classifier is used as its corresponding subgraph's SubInfo. Through generating relational (aggregated) features, each subgraph may separately be "flattened" into a set of attribute-based training instances. Learning algorithms such as decision trees [19] or support vector machines [20] may subsequently be applied to learn the relational target concept, forming a number of subgraph classifiers. Accordingly, the subgraph classifiers are able to generate corresponding SubInfo variables.
After generating the SubInfo variable for each subgraph, we are ready to compute the correlation among different subgraph subsets, which is discussed next.
3) Subschema Informativeness: Following the idea presented in [21] , a heuristic measurement has been used to evaluate the "goodness" of a subschema (i.e., a set of subgraphs), for building an accurate classification model. The "goodness" of a subschema I is calculated as follows.
Here, K is the number of SubInfo variables in the subset (i.e., subschema), R cf is the average SubInfo variable-totarget variable correlation, and R ff represents the average SubInfo variable-to-SubInfo variable dependence. This formula has previously been applied in test theory to estimate an external variable of interest [22] , [23] , [24] . Hall has adapted it into the CFS feature selection strategy [25] , where this measurement aims to discover a subset of features which are highly correlated to the class. Also, Guo and Viktor [21] utilized this formula to select a subset of useful views for multirelational classification.
The Symmetrical Uncertainty (U) [26] is used to measure the degree of correlation between SubInfo variables and the target class (R cf ) as well as the correlations between the SubInfo variables themselves (R ff ). This score is a variation of the Information Gain (InfoGain) measure [19] . It compensates for InfoGain's bias toward attributes with more values, and has been used by Ghiselli [22] and Hall [25] . Symmetrical Uncertainty is defined as follows: Given variables W and Z,
Inf oGain H(Z) + H(W )
where H(W ) and H(Z) are the entropies of the random variables W and Z, respectively. The entropy of a random variable Z is defined as
And the InfoGain is given by
Note that, these measures need all of the variables to be nominal, so SubInfo values are first discretized.
4) Subschema Privacy-Informativeness:
To protect privacy leakage, we need to consider the predictive capabilities against both the target variable (represented by I) and the confidential variable (represented by P) when a database subschema is published. Based on this observation, the TSMC method uses a subschema's PI value to reflect its performance when predicting the target variables as well as its degree of sensitivity in terms of predicting the sensitive attributes.
The PI value of a subschema is computed using Equations 1 and 2, as follows.
This formulation suggests that a subschema with more information for predicting the target variable, but with very limited predictive capability on the confidential variable, is preferred. That is, for privacy protection, a subschema should have a larger I value and a small P value.
5) Subschema Searching and Ranking:
In order to identify a subschema, i.e., a set of uncorrelated subgraphs, which has a large I value but a small P value, the evaluation procedure searches all of the possible SubInfo variable subsets, compute their PI values, and then constructs a ranking of them.
To search the SubInfo variable space, the STMC method uses a best-first search strategy [27] . The method starts with an empty set of SubInf o variables, and keeps expanding, one variable at a time. In each round of the expansion, the best variable subset, namely the subset with the highest PI value is chosen. In addition, the algorithm terminates the search if a preset number of consecutive non-improvement expansions occurs.
As a result, the method generates a ranked list of subschemas with different PI values. As described in Algorithm 1, the TSMC method calculates such a list. Accordingly, one may select a subschema based on the requirements for the predictive capabilities on both the target variable and the confidential attributes.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the information leakage in multirelational classification with experiments against a financial database. Also, we discuss the outputs resulting from the TSMC method to show its effectiveness for privacy leakage prevention in multirelational classification.
A. Data Set Used
In our experiment, we used the financial database published for the PKDD 1999 discovery challenge [28] . The database was offered by a Czech bank and contains typical business data. Figure 1 shows the database. The multirelational classification task aims to predict a new customer's risk level for a personal loan. The database consists of eight tables. Tables Account, Demographic, Disposition, Credit Card, Transaction, Client, and Order are the background relations and Loan is the target relation. The class attribute (target attribute) is the loan status in the Loan table (highlighted in red in Figure 1) , which indicates the status of the loan, namely A (finished and good), B (finished but bad), C (good but not finished), or D (bad and not finished). Our experiment used the data prepared by Yin et al. in [18] .
B. Experimental Setup
In this experiment, we consider the payment type in the Order table as being confidential and it follows that it should be protected. We assume that the payment type information will either be eliminated from the database, 
C. Experimental Results

1) Potential Privacy Leakage:
As a first step, we shifted our target variable from the loan status in the Loan table to the payment type in the Order table (highlighted in red in Figure 1 ). We used CrossMine to build a classification model [18] . Our experimental results show that we are able to build a set of rules to predict if an order is a household payment, or not, with an accuracy of 72.3%. In other words, even if we eliminate the payment type from the Order table, we can still use the remainder of the database to predict the values of payment type well. That is, there is still a potential for privacy leakage in such database, even if the sensitive attributes are eliminated or distorted in multirelational classification.
A possible solution here would be to prevent the prediction of the type of payment from the Order table with high confidence, but still maintain the predictive performance against the loan status in the Loan table. The TSMC method is designed to achieve this goal. Next, the execution of the TSMC method against this database is discussed. 2) Subschema Privacy Sensitivity: The first step of the TSMC method aims to identify attributes that predict the sensitive attributes, through searching features across multiple tables in the database. From the rules built for predicting the payment type in the Order table, 12 high coverage rules were selected. These rules cover 3341 instances in the Order table. That is, over 50% of the examples have been covered by the set of rules selected. The aim for the rule selection is to identify attributes (across tables) which are useful for predicting the sensitive attributes payment type in the Order table.
For example, Table I lists three (3) of the 12 rules learned. The first rule, as described in may be able to infer confidential information from the data mining results. These rules show how attributes across tables work together to predict the confidential attributes. In other words, these rules were able to capture the correlation and their predictive capability among multiple attributes across multiple tables, regardless the attribute types.
As described in Algorithm 1, the second step of the TSMC method is to identify the privacy sensitivity of different subschemas. Let us reconsider the first conjunction rule as shown in Table I . If we evaluate this rule at the table level, we may conclude that the subschema which consists of the tables {Order, Disposition, Client} has attributes for constructing this rule. Thus, we may want to avoid using this subschema or, at least, restrict access to it.
The privacy sensitivity of a subschema is computed using Equation 1, as described in Section III-B. Accordingly, from the tuple coverage of Table II , we calculate the degree of sensitivity for each subschema using Equation 1, and present the results in Table III. As shown in Table III , different subschemas have various privacy sensitivities, in terms of predicting the confidential attribute payment type in the Order table. For example, the subschema which consists of tables {Order, Disposition, Client, Demographic, Transaction, Account} has the highest privacy sensitivity. That is, this subschema may be used to build an accurate classification model for determining the value of an order's payment type.
Having the degrees of privacy sensitivity of different subschemas of the provided database, we are able to construct and select different subschemas with various privacy sensitivities against the confidential attributes and predictive capability for the target variables. We will discussed these two elements in detail, next.
3) Subschema Evaluation: Following the strategy as described in Section III-C, we construct the set of subgraphs from the provided database. Each subgraph corresponds to a join path starting with the target table. Eleven (11) subgraphs were constructed by the TSMC method. The subgraphs are presented in Table IV. After constructing the subgraphs, the search algorithm computes different combinations of subgraphs, resulting in different subschemas. Consequently, each subschema has a PI value which reflects information about the target variable classification as well as the predictive capability against the confidential attributes. In other words, a ranked list of subschemas, each with a measurement describing the trade-off in between the predictive capability against the target variable and confidential attribute, is created. Table V presents the top ten (10) subschemas generated from the financial database. In this table, we show the tested results against the target label (i.e., the loan status) as well as confidential attribute (namely, the payment type). For comparison purpose, we provide the accuracy as obtained against the full database schema at the bottom of the table.
From Table V , one can see that the TSMC method has created a list of subschemas with different predictive capability against the target variable and the confidential attribute. The experimental results, as shown in Table V , suggest that one can select a subschema with a good tradeoff between the two predictive capabilities.
Specifically, one is able to identify the dangerous subschemas, that pose a high data leakage risk. For example, in Table V , consider the subschema containing tables {Loan, Transaction, Account, Demographic, Client}. In this case, the accuracy against the target variable remains the same as against the full database schema. However, for the confidential attribute, the accuracy drops from 72.3% to 60.8%. It follows that it is up to the owner of the database, to decide if this potentially high level of leakage is acceptable, or not. On the other hand, in order to have more confidence on protecting the sensitive attribute, one may prefer to publish the subschema with tables {Loan, Transaction, Account, Disposition}. Using this subschema, one is able to predict the confidential payment type in the Order table with an accuracy of 54.9%. It follows that this value is only slightly better than random guessing. However, this subschema still predicts the target variable, namely the loan status from the Loan table with an accuracy of 82.5%, slightly lower than the 87.5% against the original, full database. In summary, the experimental results show that the TSMC method generates a ranked list of subschemas with different trade-off between the multirelational classification accuracy and the predictive capability against the confidential attributes.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS Multirelational classification discovers patterns across interlinked tables in a relational database [29] . For complex databases, it is becoming more difficult to detect, avoid and limit the inference capabilities between attributes, especially during data mining. This is due to the complexity of the database schema, the involvement of multiple interconnected tables and various foreign key joins, thus resulting in potential privacy leakage. For example, as shown in this paper, one may use the published database to target confidential attributes through shifting the classification target.
To address the above-mentioned challenge, the paper proposes a method to generate a ranked list of subschemas for publishing. These subschemas aim to maintain the predictive performance on the target variable, but limit the prediction accuracy against the confidential attributes. In this way, the owner of the database may decide to rather publish one of the generated subschemas which has an acceptable tradeoff between sensitive attribute protection and target variable prediction, instead of the entire database. We conducted experiments on a financial database to show the effectiveness of the strategy. Our experimental results show that our approach generates subschemas which maintain high accuracies against the target variables, while lowering the predictive capability against confidential attributes.
Our future work will include experiments on more databases with complex schemas and a very large number of tuples. As stated earlier, our approach uses a set of rules built by a classifier to detect those attributes that are correlated with a sensitive attribute. We aim to investigate other ways to detect such correlations. Furthermore, it follows that a database may contain many confidential attributes, and we will investigate new methods to address this issue.
